

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (PI) INTO THE POSSIBLE COMPROMISE OF
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL AT THE FREMONT BUILDING

Summary of communication with (b) (6) former (b) (6)
(b) (6) for Directives and Records Management Division

- Conducted a phone interview with (b) (6) on April 30th. The interview lasted approximately thirty minutes.
- (b) (6) defined her position and role as the (b) (6). She confirmed that she had access to JPAS, but not from the beginning of her assignment.
- To clarify information regarding JPAS, she stated that prior to receiving Level 6 access, all Visitor Access Requests went through (b) (6). She also clarified that she did not receive JPAS access until around August or September of 2014.
- She left her position with DRMD in late November 2014.
- (b) (6) asserted that there was no understood SOP for security or the processing of clearances for new hires.
- (b) (6) also commented that she relied on the Facility Security Officers to assist with security clearance verification, badging and access to facilities for training.
- That concluded our discussion.

(b) (6)

23 Jun 15

Signature and Date

To clarify the 6th statement, the process in place prior to me receiving JPAS access was that each contractor's FSO was responsible for forwarding clearance information through JPAS to DON/AA prior to the individuals reporting for their initial training. Once I was provided information from the contractor that the clearances had been passed, the contractors were provided temporary escorted access to the Fremont site for training purposes. Once the contractors successfully passed the training, those who would be working at the Fremont site were provided badges by me. Those who were going to be assigned to NARA were provided badges by NARA Security after the appropriate clearance information was provided to the NARA Security Department. (b) (6)

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Supplemental to the summary of communication with (b) (6)

- Conducted a follow-up telephone interview on Tuesday, June 23, 2015 from 1315 until 1340.
- When asked about the duties and responsibilities expressed in the (b) (6) letter, specifically under duty 12, section (b), number (9) which dictates the (b) (6) responsibility to ensure that FSO and other Security POCs were maintain various security requirements (b) (6) commented that the document was signed (1) year after the execution of the "new" contract. That there was little to no direction or guidance for who to coordinate with or the totality of her responsibilities related to Security as the (b) (6)
- Additionally, there was reason given for why people were directed to coordinate security matters with (b) (6)
- As for procedures, (b) (6) felt that there were no solid, established policies or procedures in place. She felt that part of this was due in part to the transition that took place as the duties and responsibilities of the Navy 1 and Navy 2 contracts moved from NCIS to DON/AA.
- She questioned is VARs were being utilized prior to the use of the Fremont Facility and questions whether to not that might have facilitated the misunderstandings that transpired.
- (b) (6) also expressed her concerns over who had SSO jurisdiction over the facility as both OPNAV and SECNAV SSO had interactions with the establishment of the facility. OPNAV to her knowledge certified the spaces and SECNAV signed off on the DD 254 forms when needed.
- (b) (6) asserts that a technical COR turnover was not done when the transition from NCIS to DON/AA took place.
- She also questions the procedures of the NARA and NHHC when they were granting (b) (6) access. Did they have to verify things through (b) (6) or did they have their own access to JPAS.
- (b) (6) also provided a copy of (b) (6) letter on the Navy 1 contract that does not discuss any responsibilities of the (b) (6) as they relate to security or clearance matters.

This information has been reviewed by (b) (6) and found to be thorough and complete.

(b) (6)

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Summary of communication with (b) (6) Department of the Navy, Declassification
Program Manager, Directives and Records Management Division

- Placed several phone calls to (b) (6) between approximately 21 and 23 April and followed up those phone calls with emails on 23 and 24 April.
- Received email reply from (b) (6) on 27 April. There are several email exchanges between (b) (6) and I; those emails will be enclosed for the record. In those emails we discussed scheduling my visit to the Fremont Facility, the requirement to send my clearance information, and the nature of my visit.
- On April 28th, I met with (b) (6) at the Fremont Facility and we had a discussion that took approximately one hour and twenty minutes. We established her work history, her position, roles and responsibilities. (b) (6) referred to an email from Dr. James Willson-Quayle notifying her of a potential incident with (b) (6) as reported by (b) (6), AECOM Program Manager. This communication occurred approximately in January 2015. (b) (6) expressed at this time her concerns about internal communications, lines of responsibility, and coordination between the Program Manager (PM), Site Manager (SM), Job Managers (JM), the (b) (6), (b) (6) and the government leads at the Fremont Facility. According to (b) (6) recollection at some point the (b) (6) had access to Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS); though at this time it was not established as to when exactly (b) (6) was given that access or what level of access she was provided. It was explained that any new hires would have their clearance information sent via email for their clearances to be verified. It was expressed that there again appeared to be little coordination with the (b) (6) PM; there were no noticeable checks and balances for their process. Not one at this point was identified as having access to Scattered Castles, an Intelligence Community, Personnel Security Database, which might have been another means of verifying (b) (6) clearance.
- (b) (6) described (b) (6) position as a reviewer, meaning she checked and verified the content of boxes being declassified at the Fremont Facility. (b) (6) noted that (b) (6) Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) was signed by (b) (6) supervisor rather than the Facility Security Officer. (b) (6) considered it highly likely that (b) (6) came across collateral/non-collateral documents, simply by the nature of the job. There are no measures in place to determine what the content of the boxes are until they are opened and reviewed.
- (b) (6) asserts that a formal and public Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the facility was not in place until after the incident in question. (b) (6) provided via email in April 28th a correspondence between her (b) (6) and (b) (6), dated March 20, 2013 describing the then efforts to create a SOP, which never came to fruition.
- (b) (6) also highlighted that (b) (6) worked at the Fremont Facility, but was also badged for the National Archives and Records Administration facility.

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